by David Allen Green
The issue of the European Economic Area is back among those who talk and think about Brexit. This post sets out, from a law and policy perspective, why staying in the EEA is not a simple or necessarily attractive option for those who want a softer form of Brexit, but that it may be the only practical option the UK has if Brexit is to be done with rapidity.
The EEA
The EEA is provided by a 1994 agreement. If you scroll down to page 4 of the legal text of the EEA agreement you will see an impressive list of the signatories. In particular you will see the UK as a party to the agreement.
The agreement is, in effect, between three members of the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and the member states of the EU. Formally, the contracting parties are, however, the individual counties (though the EU was also added as a party in 2004).
Now scroll down to page 7 and you will see that the agreement entails:
“(a) the free movement of goods;
(b) the free movement of persons;
(c) the free movement of services;
(d) the free movement of capital;
(e) the setting up of a system ensuring that competition is not distorted and that the rules thereon are equally respected; as well as
(f) closer cooperation in other fields, such as research and development, the environment, education and social policy.”
In effect, it means the “single market” is extended to the three EFTA states party to the agreement. (The fourth association member, Switzerland, is not party to the EEA agreement and its relationship with the EU single market is by means of several bilateral agreements.) The EEA and EFTA are not the same thing. The EEA is the name for the economic area created between three members of EFTA and members of the EU.
The EEA is not a customs union, and EFTA states are free to enter trade agreements with other nations. The EEA more or less adopts EU rules on the single market (including free movement) but the non-EU members have little say in those rules. The EEA is, essentially, membership for three non-EU countries of the EU single market on the EU’s terms, but with the non-EU members also able to set their own tariffs with third-party countries.
Leaving the EEA
If you now scroll the EEA legal text even further down, you will get to Article 127. This provides:
“Each Contracting Party may withdraw from this Agreement provided it gives at least twelve months’ notice in writing to the other Contracting Parties.
“Immediately after the notification of the intended withdrawal, the other Contracting Parties shall convene a diplomatic conference in order to envisage the necessary modifications to bring to the Agreement.”
The UK is a “contracting party”. On the face of it this exit provision means that Britain will have to give notice so as to no longer be a party to the agreement. The apparent implication is that, unless such notice is given, the UK will remain bound by the EEA.
The UK has not expressly provided any such notice. The (verbose and rambling) Article 50 letter mentioned many things, including explicit references to Euratom, but it did not mention the EEA agreement.
This raises the question as to whether the Article 50 notice implicitly contained a notice to quit the agreement. A related question is whether leaving the EU on 29 March 2019 (or another agreed date) would have the necessary effect of the UK leaving the EEA, regardless of whether notice is given or not.
The answer to neither of these questions is clear. Scroll up in the legal text to Article 126, and you will see the following in its first paragraph:
“The Agreement shall apply to the territories to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty, and to the territories of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway.”
The UK (or any other EU member) is not listed in Article 126(1). But this provision expressly states the economic area of the EEA is the (now) EU and the three named EFTA countries.
On the face of it, the position would be that on Brexit the UK may (unless notice is given under Article 126) continue to be a signatory to the EEA agreement but would it also be outside the scope of the EEA by reason of Article 126(1), because it is no longer in the EU?
The situation is a muddle. What Article 127 seems to offer (that the UK can stay a member of the EEA unless notice is given) seems to be countered by Article 126(1) (that the EEA is defined as the EU plus the three named countries from EFTA).
There is still, of course, time left for the UK to provide express notice under Article 127. The one-year period can be fitted in within the two-year Article 50 period. Notice to leave the EEA would thereby need only to be given on 29 March next year.
The current position
Following on from the above, the following points are clear:
the UK is currently part of the EEA
the UK is a party to the EEA agreement
the UK being part of the EEA will continue to at least 29 March 2019
the UK has not expressly provided notice to leave the EEA agreement under Article 127
on Brexit (29 March 2019 or another agreed date), the UK will not be within the EEA as defined in Article 126(1)
What is not clear are the following:
whether the UK implicitly gave notice under Article 127 when it sent the Article 50 letter
whether, regardless of any notice to leave the EEA agreement, the UK will simply be outside the scope of the EEA on Brexit, meaning that the EEA will cease to have any meaningful effect on the country in any case
Can parliament block the UK leaving the EEA?
In November 2016, this blog was dismissive of the litigation being brought to get a court to rule on whether the UK was leaving the EEA as part of the Brexit process.
The litigation was in respect of two claims.
The first was that the UK has allegedly already decided that an automatic consequence of leaving the EU is that the EEA agreement would cease to apply to the UK and that notification of withdrawal from the EEA Agreement under Article 127 is not required. The submission was that that alleged decision was wrong as it is based on a misunderstanding of the effect of the EEA agreement and so should be quashed.
The second claim was that leaving the EEA was not lawful without prior approval from HM Treasury and an act of parliament providing authorisation.
The High Court decided in February (unreported, but many thanks to Peter Wilding, one of the claimants, for a copy of the judgment):
“48. In our judgment, the present claims are premature. The relevant legal and factual situations against which the various claims made will need to be assessed have not yet occurred. There is, as yet, no final decision by the Government as to the mechanism by which it considers that the EEA Agreement would cease to apply within the United Kingdom.
“49. A Bill is currently before Parliament which, if enacted, will authorise the giving of notification of withdrawal under Article 50 TEU. However, the precise terms of the legislation as finally enacted cannot yet be known. There is as yet no legislation
dealing with the repeal of the 1972 Act, including the provisions giving effect within
domestic law in the United Kingdom to the rights derived from the EEA Agreement. It is not known whether any legislation will also amend the terms of the 1993 Act.
50. In such circumstances, the court cannot at present identify with precision, first, what, if any, justifiable issues will arise for adjudication by the courts and, secondly, the full factual and legal context in which any such issues will fall to be assessed. The precise terms of any such legislation are likely to have at least a significant bearing on the determination of any such issues.
“51. The court cannot be sure which, if any, of the many issues raised by the two sets of Claimants really will require adjudication by the courts. Consequently, in our judgment, the current claims are premature. For that reason, permission to apply for judicial review is refused.”
The defeat was not a surprise. And, as this blog averred in November, no domestic court will easily insist that a government is to be bound by an international agreement when the government says it is not. This blog stated:
“The Article 127 point is an ingenious one; but at this stage it is difficult to see what traction any challenge in the courts would have in forcing the UK government to do (or not do) something other than what it (or parliament) determines to do with Brexit.
“There are, however, two ways Article 127 could perhaps make a substantial difference — but as a shield rather than a sword. One is if the UK government wanted the basis for legal (or legalistic) cover for remaining in the single market whilst leaving the EU. The problems posed by Article 126 could be fudged in this scenario.
“The other is if parliament wanted constitutional cover for slowing down any Brexit legislation which did not keep the UK in the single market, arguably because there is no mandate for leaving. A parliamentary vote on UK remaining in the EEA may have a different result to one on the Article 50 notification. Parliament could even expressly legislate that the Article 127 notification cannot be given. This would then create a delicious international law problem of whether giving an Article 50 notification to leave the EU implicitly also means giving Article 127 notification to leave the EEA. This would presumably would have to be determined by the EFTA court.”
The second of these possibilities appears now to be in play. There is, it is reported, a cross-party group of MPs who are seeking to force a vote on whether the UK should also be leaving the EEA. Because of the changed composition of the House of Commons after the general election it is possible that the government could lose this vote.
There is certainly political noise about UK staying in the EEA. The chancellor Philip Hammond has mentioned an “off the shelf” approach which seems to mean the UK being within the EEA. William Hague has also endorsed the possibility. The opposition MP Stephen Kinnock said in a FT article last weekend:
“The simplest option is for Britain to transition into the European Economic Area (EEA) — a free-trade bloc between the EU, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein that provides unfettered access to the single market. It is a well-established and well-understood arrangement that offers the clarity and stability that the British economy needs in these turbulent times.”
Another opposition MP Heidi Alexander has said much the same.
So the EEA option is certainly being touted as a political solution. The suggestion has the happy appearance of being a compromise and the course of least resistance at a time of a speedy and reckless Brexit. But does this proposed solution meet the problem? Or does it cause new problems?
The possible conflict between EEA membership and the Brexit mandate
The former MEP (and federalist) Andrew Duff tweeted a couple of weeks ago that:
“EEA means no customs union, steep payments to EU, free movement of labour, diktat by Brussels & no democracy.”
There is force in this. Membership of the EEA will mean the UK is not part of the EU customs union. The EFTA members of the EEA do pay an amount to the EU. There is, in principle, freedom of movement (though Article 112 of the EEA agreement provides for exceptions). The EU rules on the single market will apply without the UK having any formal say.
If the Brexit referendum vote is taken to mean, as the UK government says it does, that the UK will have control of its money, its borders and its laws then it is difficult to see how EEA membership is compatible with that perceived mandate.
And this conceptual and political problem is in addition to the facts that UK is not a member of the EFTA, that it cannot take for granted that it can become a member and that membership of the EEA will mean, at least, a renegotiation of the EEA agreement on top of the Brexit negotiations.
The EEA option looks like an easy one, but this superficial ease only masks further complications. Staying in the EEA is not something that can be done, like magic, because of a one-off cross-party vote.
Taking this route may only add time and trouble to the Brexit process, and may not meet many of the perceived requirements of the referendum mandate. Whatever its merits, it is not a quick fix.
But, on the other hand, against a looming hard Brexit, with the UK out of the single market as well as the customs union in a matter of months, the option has the attraction of convenience, at least on a temporary basis. And the UK staying in the EEA, but outside the EU, would certainly fulfill the strict literal requirement of the referendum question, that the UK will leave the EU.
The EEA is not an ideal port for a ship seeking shelter from the worst of the upcoming Brexit storm, but some say it may be the only port available. And for them, docking in this port is perhaps better for the UK than sailing straight into the storm just because it is exciting, insisting on a perfect port and nothing less, or maintaining that there is no impending storm at all.
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